Dismissal of inmate’s suit affirmed for failure to follow procedure, but judgment clarified to show dismissal without prejudice

   
Lawsuits brought by people who are in jail are subject to different rules, which are spelled out in Chapter 14 of  the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Noncompliance constitutes ground for dismissal without the need for a hearing even, but the dismissal should be without prejudice, as the First Court of Appeals makes clear in an opinion issued December 8, 2011.
  

The trial courts are given broad discretion to determine whether a suit brought by an inmate should be dismissed because (1) prisoners have a strong incentive to litigate; (2) the government bears the cost of an in forma pauperis suit; (3) sanctions are not effective; and (4) the dismissal of unmeritorious claims accrues to the benefit of state officials, courts, and meritorious claimants. See Williams v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 176 S.W.3d 590, 593 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, pet. denied). When a trial court does not state the basis for its dismissal, we will affirm the dismissal if it is proper under any legal theory. Walker v. Gonzales Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 35 S.W.3d 157, 162 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. denied).

Legal Principles

A party who is unable to afford trial court costs may file an affidavit of indigence that conforms with the requirements of Rule 145 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(a), (b). An inmate who brings a suit in which he has filed an affidavit of indigence or an unsworn declaration of inability to pay costs must also comply with the procedural requirements set forth in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 14. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.002(a) (Vernon Supp. 2011); Scott, 209 S.W.3d at 265.

Civil Practice and Remedies Code sections 14.004 and 14.006 require that an inmate file in the trial court, along with his affidavit of indigence or unsworn declaration of inability to pay costs, a certified copy of his inmate trust account statement. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 14.004(c) (Vernon Supp. 2011), 14.006(f) (Vernon 2002). Section 14.006(f) requires that the inmate file a statement that “reflect[s] the balance of the account at the time the claim is filed and activity in the account during the six months preceding the date on which the claim is filed.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.006(f).

“A prisoner at a Texas Department of Criminal Justice [facility] who has no money or property is considered indigent.” McClain v. Terry, 320 S.W.3d 394, 397 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.) (citing Allred v. Lowry, 597 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. 1980)). However, “[a]n inmate who has funds in his trust account is not indigent.” Id. (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.006(b)(1)). An inmate’s trust funds may be utilized for payment of costs. Id.

Failure to fulfill the Chapter 14 procedural requirements may result in the dismissal of the inmate’s suit before or after service of process. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(a)(1), 14.006(h) (Vernon 2002); Scott, 209 S.W.3d at 265 (“A trial court may dismiss an inmate’s lawsuit for failing to comply with the procedural requirements of Chapter 14.”); Bell v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 962 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied)).

Dismissal

The record before us does not reflect that Yates filed a certified copy of his inmate trust account statement with his declaration of inability to pay costs in the trial court, as required. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.004(c), 14.006(f). The requirement to file a statement of the inmate trust account is mandatory, and Yates’s failure to file the statement is sufficient grounds for the trial court’s dismissal of his suit. See id. § 14.003(a); Williams v. Brown, 33 S.W.3d 410, 412 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.); see also Jedkins v. Varghese, No. 14-08-00895-CV, 2009 WL 5149877, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 31, 2009, no pet.) (mem.op., not designated for publication) (“Chapter 14 does not provide an inmate with the right to file a suit without the trust account statement, no matter the reason that the inmate has not provided it.”).

Yates complains that the trial court did not rule on his second affidavit of indigence, which he filed October 20, 2008. The record reflects, however, that the trial court had just days before, on October 6, 2008, ruled on Yates’s first declaration of indigence. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 14.004(c) (allowing unsworn declaration of inability to pay costs). In his brief on appeal, appellant acknowledges that his first “request to proceed without costs contained in [the] Petition was recognized by the trial court.” Moreover, the record reflects that Yates also failed to attach a copy of his inmate trust account to his second affidavit of indigence. After the trial court’s dismissal, appellant filed a statement of his inmate trust account in conjunction with his affidavit of indigence for costs on appeal.

In addition, appellant complains that the trial court failed to notify him of a deficiency in his declaration of inability to pay costs prior to dismissing his suit. Because a trial court may dismiss a suit that fails to comply with Chapter 14 either before or after service of process and without a hearing, a trial court has no duty to suggest or recommend that an appellant amend his pleading. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(c); Hickman v. Adams, 35 S.W.3d 120, 125 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).

Because the trial court did not specify the grounds for dismissal, we will affirm the decision if any theory is meritorious. See Walker, 35 S.W.3d at 162. Because Yates failed to file a certified copy of his inmate trust account statement with his declaration of inability to pay costs in the trial court, as required, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Yates’s suit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 14.004(c), 14.006(f); Brown, 33 S.W.3d at 412.

Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s issue.

The dismissal order does not, however, state whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice. “Dismissal with prejudice constitutes adjudication on the merits and operates as if the case had been fully tried and decided.” Brown, 33 S.W.3d at 412 (quoting Lentworth v. Trahan, 981 S.W.2d 720, 722 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.)). In the present case, dismissal without prejudice is proper. We modify the judgment to reflect that the cause is dismissed “without prejudice.”

Conclusion

As modified, the judgment is affirmed. We dismiss pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Sharp, and Brown.

SOURCT: FIRST COURT OF APPEALS – HOUSTON – CASE NO 01-09-00031-CV – OPINION OF 12/8/11

Inmate's suit against his appointed lawyer revived

First Court of Appeals, in opinion by Chief Justice Radack, rules that prisoner's suit against his appointed counsel was improperly dismissed pursuant to a no-evidence motion for summary judgment. Defendant's claim that he was not a public employee was not relevant to the elements of plaintiff's cause of action in the summary judgment proceeding. Immunity issues - which might provide a valid basis for dismissal - were not before the court.

Poledore v. Fraley No. 01-07-00583-CV (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] June 19, 2008)(Radack) (TTCA, prisoner suit against appointed attorney for malpractice, no-evidence motion for summary judgment reversed)
Opinion by Chief Justice Radack
Panel: Before Chief Justice Radack, Justices Keyes and Hanks
Full case style: Dennis James Poledore, Jr. v. Frank J. Fraley
Appeal from 268th District Court of Fort Bend County
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Brady G. Elliott
Disposition: Trial court judgment reversed, case remanded for further proceedings

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Dennis James Poledore, Jr., appeals the trial court's granting of a no-evidence summary judgment in favor of appellee, Frank Jerome Fraley. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

Poledore, an inmate in the Texas Department of Corrections--Institutional Division, filed a civil suit against Fraley, the court-appointed attorney who represented him in his criminal case, alleging that Fraley had (1) committed forgery by amending a waiver of arraignment document that Poledore had previously signed, and (2) failed to hire a private investigator to work on Poledore's case. Poledore's petition alleged that it was a "Tort Civil Action at Law for Damages" and that jurisdiction was "invoked by the Texas Tort Claims Act." By way of the suit, Poledore sought to recover $50,000 in monetary damages from Fraley.

Fraley filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment alleging that there was "no evidence of one or more of the following elements of Tort Claim." Specifically, Fraley claimed that Poledore had not produced any evidence that Fraley was an "employee" as that term is defined by the Tort Claims Act. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.001(2) (Vernon 2005). The trial court granted Fraley's motion.

PROPRIETY OF NO-EVIDENCE SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In his sole issue on appeal, Poledore contends the trial court erred in granting Fraley's no-evidence motion for summary judgment.
Standard of Review

To prevail on a no-evidence summary judgment motion, a movant must allege that there is no evidence of an essential element of the adverse party's cause of action. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese, 148 S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex. 2004). We review a no-evidence summary judgment under the same legal sufficiency standard used to review a directed verdict. Boaz v. Boaz, 221 S.W.3d 126, 130 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Although the non-movant need not marshal its proof, it must present evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact on each of the challenged elements. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). A no-evidence summary judgment motion may not properly be granted if the non-movant brings forth more than a scintilla of evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged elements. See Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 600. More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence "rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions." Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997).

Analysis

In his motion for no-evidence summary judgment, Fraley argued that Poledore had no evidence to prove an "element" of his claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act. Specifically, Fraley argued that there was no evidence that he was an "employee" of a governmental unit, and that he was, instead, an independent contractor.

"[T]he Tort Claims Act does not create a cause of action; it merely waives sovereign immunity as a bar to a suit that would otherwise exist." City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 494 (Tex. 1997); see also City of Houston v. Boyle, 148 S.W.3d 171, 179 (Tex. App--Houston [1st Dist] 2004, no pet.) ("The TCA does not create a cause of action, but merely establishes a waiver of governmental immunity.").

As such, Poledore's failure to prove that Fraley is an employee of a governmental unit means that Poledore has not established a waiver of sovereign immunity.

However, no party has claimed immunity in this case, and Poledore is not seeking to hold a governmental unit responsible for Fraley's actions. Quite simply, sovereign immunity and the application of the Tort Claims Act are not issues in this case.

Because the Tort Claims Act does not create a cause of action, whether Fraley is an "employee" of a governmental unit is not an "element" of Poledore's cause of action. (1) Fraley's no-evidence motion for summary judgment does not attack an essential element of Poledore's cause of action, thus the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in Fraley's favor.

CONCLUSION

We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

Sherry Radack
Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Keyes and Higley.

Prisoner's Bill of Review suit fails following appellate win in prior case

First Court of Appeals, in memo opinion by Justice Tim Taft, affirms trial court's denial of inmate's bill of review. Same plaintiff had won a reversal in the other Houston court of appeals in prior suit. In restating the requirements for a successful attack on a judgment by bill of review, reviewing court holds that the fact that an injustice was committed does not provide sufficient grounds for relief.

Williams v. TDCJ-ID No. 01-06-00404-CV (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 10, 2008)(Taft)(bill of review denied, multiple suits and appeals)
Before Justices Taft, Hanks and Higley) Howard Vanzandt Williams v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice-ID
Appeal from 23rd District Court of Brazoria County (Judge Ben Hardin)
Disposition: Trial court's judgment affirmed

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUSTICE TAFT

Howard Vanzandt Williams appeals the trial court’s order denying his bill of review. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

Howard Vanzandt Williams, an inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division (“TDCJ–ID”), sued Dale Denault, a corrections officer employed by TDCJ–ID, and TDCJ–ID. The trial court dismissed the suit in its entirety, and Williams appealed to the 14th Court of Appeals. The 14th Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal as to Denault only and reversed it as to claims against TDCJ–ID. See Williams v. Denault, No. 14-00-00889-CV, 2001 WL 1249311, *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] October 18, 2001, no pet.) (memo op.).
Concluding that Williams had stated a claim against TDCJ–ID subject to the Texas Tort Claims Act, but that Williams had not served TDCJ–ID nor had TDCJ–ID answered the allegations, the 14th Court held that “the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that the case was dismissed with prejudice and in its entirety as frivolous.” Id. at *4. In so holding, the court determined that the trial court’s order dismissing the entire action with prejudice “cannot be said to operate as a dismissal on the merits of a defendant that has not yet been served or answered on the record.” Id. at *4.

The opinion from the 14th Court of Appeals issued on October 18, 2001. On March 12, 2003, Denault’s attorney, a representative from the Attorney General’s office, filed an amicus motion to dismiss the claims against TDCJ–ID for want of prosecution and as frivolous because the statute of limitations had run. An order of dismissal was signed in July and again in December of 2003. The orders are identical, except that the December order includes the language, “All relief not specifically granted is denied.”

In April of 2006, Williams filed a petition for a bill of review seeking to set aside the court’s judgment dismissing his claims against TDCJ–ID. That petition does not contain a certificate of service. As best we can determine, Williams alleged that TDCJ–ID waived service. The trial court denied the petition for bill of review without a hearing.

Bill of Review

A bill of review is an independent equitable action brought by a party to a former action seeking to set aside a judgment that is no longer appealable or subject to a motion for new trial. Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. 1979). The grounds upon which a bill of review can be obtained are narrow because the procedure conflicts with the fundamental policy that judgments must become final at some point. Transworld Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Briscoe, 722 S.W.2d 407, 407 (Tex. 1987); Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 569, 226 S.W.2d 996, 998 (1950). The mere fact that an injustice has been done is not sufficient to warrant granting a bill of review. Alexander, 148 Tex. at 569, 226 S.W.2d at 998.

A party who has participated in the trial court proceedings must plead and prove three elements to obtain a bill of review: (1) a meritorious ground of appeal exists; (2) which the party was prevented from presenting in a motion for new trial or ordinary appeal by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party, or official mistake or misinformation; (3) unmixed with the fault or negligence of the petitioner. McDaniel v. Hale, 893 S.W.2d 652, 660, 662–63 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1994, writ denied); see Petro-Chem. Transp., Inc. v. Carroll, 514 S.W.2d 240, 245–46 (Tex. 1974). A meritorious ground of appeal is one that, had it been presented to the appellate court as designed, might, and probably would, have caused the judgment to be reversed. Petro-Chem., 514 S.W.2d at 245.

In our review, we must indulge every presumption in favor of the trial court’s ruling. Nguyen v. Intertex, Inc., 93 S.W.3d 288, 293 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.). We will not disturb that ruling unless the petitioner is able to show affirmatively that there was an abuse of judicial discretion. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion only if it acts in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner or without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Id. Finally, because we have no findings of fact or conclusions of law entered in this case, we must affirm the trial court’s ruling on any theory finding support in the record. See id. When the inquiry on the bill of review concerns questions of law, such as whether an appellant presented prima facie proof of a meritorious ground of appeal, we review the trial court’s decision de novo. See BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002).

As a pretrial matter, the plaintiff must present prima facie proof to support the alleged meritorious claim. Caldwell v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93, 97 (Tex. 2004); Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408; Martin v. Martin, 840 S.W.2d 586, 591 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1992, writ denied). If the trial court concludes that a prima facie meritorious ground of appeal has not been shown, it may dismiss the case without conducting a trial. Beck v. Beck, 771 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Tex. 1989); Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 409.

Prima facie proof may consist of documents, admissions, and affidavits, along with other evidence that the trial court may receive. Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 409. Williams presented no proof to support the allegations contained in his petition for bill of review. See Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 97. Thus, the trial court did not err if it concluded that Williams failed to establish a meritorious claim in his bill of review.

Conclusion

We affirm the order of the trial court.

Tim Taft
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Taft, Hanks, and Higley.

Justice Hanks affirms dismissal of prisoner's civil rights complaint

Inmate's pro se suit was not accompanied by detailed disclosure of prior law suits.

Jemmerison v. Officer Salazar, No. (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 8, 2007 (Hanks)(pro se prisoner suit)

Appeal from 412th Judicial District Court of Brazoria County
Disposition: Affirm dismissal of suit without hearing
Full style: Thomas Jemmerison v. Officer I. Salazar

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUSTICE GEORGE C. HANKS, JR.

In this pro se appeal, appellant, Thomas Jemmerison, challenges the trial court’s dismissal of his petition, in which he claimed Officer I. Salazar violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division (“TDCJ-ID”) Civil Rights Act. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.


Background


On May 19, 2006, Jemmerison filed a suit pro se and in forma pauperis against Salazar, a Darrington Trusty Camp correctional officer, claiming that she had violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment and TDCJ-ID Civil Rights Act while he was an inmate at the Darrington Trusty Camp. Specifically, Jemmerison accused Salazar of “harassing me, discriminating against me, retaliating against me, jeopardizing my safety, having malice against me, abusing her authority against me, showing favoritism against me, showing prejudices against me, being racism [sic] against me, and . . . [making] untrue allegations against me that I . . . tried to solicitate [sic] her.” In Jemmerison’s petition, he requested a pre-trial Spears [Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds, Neitzke v. Williams,490 U.S. 319, 324, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1831 (1989).] hearing in order to present evidence and answer the trial court’s questions concerning his accusations. Jemmerison claims to have tried numerous times to inform various personnel about Salazar’s behavior and also claims to have filed many grievances against her.


In his complaint, Jemmerison sought to have Salazar relieved of her duties as a correctional officer. He included an affidavit seeking to press criminal charges against her. He also motioned for injunctions to be granted against various prison officials, including Salazar, to prevent them from retaliating against him by having him transferred. Despite this request, he claims on appeal that he was the victim of a retaliatory transfer to the Wynne Trusty Camp in April 2006.

Salazar never responded to Jemmerison’s petition, and the trial court, without granting Jemmerison any hearing, dismissed the suit. At the time of filing his appeal, Jemmerison was incarcerated at the Kyle Correctional Center. Jemmerison challenges the trial court’s dismissal and, along with claiming trial court error, seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages for emotional and mental injuries.In his first issue, Jemmerison argues that the trial court was wrong in dismissing his cause. He alleges that the trial court failed to follow the proper procedures concerning his request for a Spears hearing. He also asserts that his petition is not frivolous, because he proved that Salazar violated his Eighth Amendment rights by exposing him to an substantial risk of serious harm.


In his second issue, Jemmerison asserts various reasons why Salazar should be denied immunity in this action. He essentially alleges that, because Salazar was aware of her unprofessional behavior, she should be denied sovereign immunity, as well as judicial and quasi-judicial immunity.


In his third and fourth issues, Jemmerison brings factual and legal sufficiency complaints. His factual sufficiency complaints center on situations where Salazar allegedly made him use Clorox Bleach without the implementation of proper safety precautions. In his legal sufficiency argument, Jemmerison claims that Salazar violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.


Order of Dismissal


Jemmerison first attacks the trial court’s dismissal of his claim. In its order of dismissal, the trial court dismissed the suit for being “frivolous or malicious because [Jemmerison] has failed to state a claim that has an arguable basis in law or in fact as required by Section 13.001 (b) (2) Civ. Prac. Rem. Code and/or Section 14.003, Civ. Prac. Rem. Code, and/or [Jemmerison] failed to follow the provisions of Section 14.004, Civ. Prac. Rem. Code.” On appeal, Jemmerison makes a series of claims to address this dismissal. He asserts that the reasons for dismissal set out by the trial court are not true because the trial court erred by failing to follow the proper procedures regarding his motion for a Spears hearing. Jemmerison claims that he complied with Chapters 13 and 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code before filing his suit. He further alleges that the trial court committed a clear error in judgment. He also asserts that his claims are not frivolous or malicious because he first attempted to use Darrington Unit Grievance Procedures and informed Darrington Unit administrative personnel and TDCJ-ID Region III directors about his allegations.


We begin our analysis by examining the reasons given by the trial court for its dismissal. We review a dismissal under Chapter 14 for abuse of discretion. Moreland v. Johnson, 95 S.W.3d 392, 394 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). A trial court commits an abuse of discretion if it acts arbitrarily, capriciously, and without reference to guiding rules or principles. Id.


Jemmerison states that he asserted his claim under Chapters 13 and 14 before he filed his complaint. Under Section 14.004, an inmate filing an affidavit or unsworn declaration of an inability to pay costs shall also file a separate affidavit or declaration identifying previous pro se actions brought by the inmate. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.004 (Vernon 2002). This separate affidavit or declaration must describe the former actions specifically by: “(A) stating the operative facts for which relief was sought; (B) listing the case name, cause number, and the court in which the suit was brought; (C) identifying each party named in the suit; and (D) stating the result of the suit, including whether the suit was dismissed as frivolous or malicious under Section 13.001 or Section 14.003 or otherwise.” Id. § 14.004(a)(2). The purpose of the Section 14.004 requirements is to assist the trial court in determining whether the inmate’s current suit is malicious or frivolous under Section 14.003(a). Gowan v. Tex. Dep’t. of Crim. Justice, 99 S.W.3d 319, 321 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.).


In Jemmerison’s unsworn declaration of previous civil litigation, he described his past pro se actions as follows:


I, Jemmerison’s the offender claim in civil action # H-00-2272 was dismissed with prejudice on September 27, 2001, and my claim in civil action # P-00-CA-034 was dismissed without prejudice on May 14, 2002, and I did not appeal neither the above case’s.

This description is insufficient to meet the requirements of 14.004(a)(2). Jemmerison did not state the operative facts for which relief was sought, the case names, the courts in which he brought the suits, the parties named in the suits, or the results of the suits, including whether the suits were dismissed as frivolous or malicious under Section 13.001, Section 14.003, or otherwise. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.004(2).

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Jemmerison’s complaint for his failure to comply with 14.004. Having found that Jemmerison failed to comply with the requirements of 14.004, we need not address whether his claim was frivolous. We also need not discuss whether the trial court erred in failing to follow the correct procedures concerning Jemmerison’s motion for a Spears hearing.


Conclusion


We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

George C. Hanks, Jr.
Justice


Panel consists of Justices Taft, Hanks, and Higley.