Ex-Judge Denise Pratt (non) news - Sanctions pronouncement by State Commission on Judicial Conduct "with all deliberate speed"

Former Harris County Family District Court Judge Denise Pratt finally slapped on the wrist by the State Commission of Judicial Conduct for tardiness and apparent back-dating of orders to cover up her lack in diligence in getting the business of the court done. Ironically, the sanctions opinion was tardy too. Pratt is long gone from office and lost her bid for re-election.  

The pdf version of the sanctions order, issued September 4, 2014, can be found at http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/pdf/actions/FY2015-PUBSANC.pdf

Here is a text verbatim (it' a rather tedious read). 
The bottom line: A Public Reprimand.

Given all the coverage in the local media at the time the scandal broke, and the story developed, it's hardly big news now. 

PUBLIC SANCTIONS

FY 2015

The following are public sanctions (reproduced in their entirety) which were issued by the Commission during fiscal year 2015. The public records for these cases are available for inspection at the Commission’s offices located at 300 W. 15th Street, Suite 145, Austin, Texas.

BEFORE THE

STATE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT

CJC NOS. 14-0102-DI, 14-0165-DI, 14-0224-DI, 14-0403-DI,

14-0435-DI, 14-0468-DI, 14-0472-DI, 14-0473-DI, 14-0484-DI,

14-0508-DI, 14-0529-DI, 14-0654-DI&14-0655-DI

PUBLIC REPRIMAND

HONORABLE DENISE V. PRATT

FORMER JUDGE, 311TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

HOUSTON, HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

During its meeting on August 13-15, 2014, the State Commission on Judicial Conduct concluded a review of the allegations against the Honorable Denise V. Pratt, Former Judge of the 311th Judicial District Court, Houston, and Harris County, Texas. Judge Pratt appeared before the Commission on August 14, 2014, and gave testimony.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Judge Pratt was elected to the 311th Judicial District Court bench in November 2010, and assumed the bench on January 1, 2011. Starting in October 2013, the Commission began receiving complaints filed by attorneys, litigants, and confidential sources alleging numerous incidents of misconduct against Judge Pratt, including malfeasance by backdating court orders and judgments, excessive and unreasonable delays in issuing decisions, a lack of diligence in attending to the business of the court, and incompetence in performing the duties of office. Many of the matters raised in the complaints became the subject of extensive local media attention in the Houston area. In particular, it was disclosed in the press that allegations contained in the complaint of attorney Greg Enos had become the subject of a criminal investigation by the Harris County District Attorney’s Office into the conduct of Judge Pratt.

In Enos’ criminal complaint, Judge Pratt was accused of backdating court orders and renditions in order to cover up for the lengthy delays in her rulings in contested family law cases. It was alleged that Judge Pratt backdated the orders to make it appear that she had issued rulings sooner than she actually did and that the judge was assisted by court staff, who rolled back the clerk’s date stamp, then initialed and filed backdated orders knowing that Judge Pratt had not signed the documents on the dates she claimed. Enos provided examples in six cases of orders or renditions that appeared to have been signed by Judge Pratt months earlier but that were not filed or provided to the parties or their attorneys until much later and well after the time to appeal had expired. According to media reports, Judge Pratt’s lead clerk, Marilyn Epps, who had twenty-five years of experience as a Harris County court clerk, resigned following an investigation by the Harris County District Clerk’s office into the backdating allegations after admitting to one instance of rolling back her date stamp to match what Judge Pratt had written as the date she purportedly signed the rendition. However, there appeared to be no evidence to support a finding that Epps engaged in this conduct at Judge Pratt’s request, direction, or instruction. In December 2013, a grand jury investigating Enos’ complaint against Judge Pratt declined to indict the judge. During this time, Judge Pratt filed to run for re-election and became one of four candidates vying for election to the 311th District Court in the March 2014 Republican Primary.

In January 2014, additional complaints were filed with the Commission after Judge Pratt issued dismissal orders disposing of more than approximately 600 pending cases on December 30-31, 2013. According to the complaints, without notice to the parties or their attorneys or an opportunity to be heard, cases were dismissed for want of prosecution even though a substantial number of the cases had recent activity; were awaiting the judge’s signature on orders following trial, mediation, or arbitration; were set for trial in 2014; or had already been transferred to other courts following Judge Pratt’s recusal. Enos filed a second criminal complaint with the Harris County District Attorney’s office concerning the en mass dismissals alleging that Judge Pratt illegally purged her docket on the last two days of 2013 to cover up the growing backlog caused by her failure or inability to timely handle the business of the court.

Although Judge Pratt received the most votes in the March 2014 Republican Primary, she did not receive at least 50% of the votes and her name was placed on the ballot for the May 2014 Republican Primary Run-off election. However, on March 28, 2014, after Enos filed a third criminal complaint against her with the Harris County District Attorney’s Office, Judge Pratt sent a letter to the Governor of Texas announcing that she was immediately resigning from office. Despite her resignation, Judge Pratt’s name remained on the ballot for the May 2014 runoff election, which she lost.

In August 2014, the Commission concluded its investigation into the allegations filed against Judge Pratt. After considering the evidence before it, the Commission entered the following Findings and Conclusions.

Harris County Family Law Center 

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. At all times relevant hereto, the Honorable Denise V. Pratt was Judge of the 311th
Judicial District Court in Houston, Harris County, Texas.

DELAYS IN RULING

The Bates Case

State Bar Seeks Immediate Suspension of Local Attorney

Sep. 15. The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the State Bar of Texas this morning filed an original petition with the Harris County District Clerk seeking the immediate interim suspension of local personal injury attorney Grace Diane Kopacz. The case was assigned to the 334th District Court, the Honorable Sharon McCally presiding.

The Petition alleges that "Respondent has engaged in conduct that includes all the elements of money laundering and insurance fraud, which are both serious crimes" and concludes that "Respondent poses a substantial threat of irreparable harm to clients and prospective clients by reason of this conduct and, therefore, must be suspended from practicing law pending a final disposition of the disposition of the disciplinary proceeding." A hearing is to be set within 10 days.

The specific factual allegations, which also form the basis for criminal indictment, according to news reports earlier this year (see Lawyer and husband charged with money laundering), can be found in Part II of the petition. See copy of Original Petition for Immediate Interim Suspension in Cause No. 2009-59239; Commission for Lawyer Discipline vs Grace Diane Kopacz.

State Bar records indicate that Kopacz was licensed in 2004 and has her own law firm (LAW OFFICE OF GRACE D. KOPACZ) with primary practice area in personal injury law, located on West Loop South in Houston. See SBOT Member Profile of Grace Diane Kopacz

In unrelated disbarment news, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals last week issued an informative opinion which provides a cautionary tale of the dire consequences of a lesser but nonetheless serious form of prohibited conduct - the commingling of client trust funds with other monies, and the use of IOLTA accounts for payroll, business and other expenses.
Neely v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist] Sep. 10, 2009) (Frost) (affirming attorney's disbarment for commingling of funds, use of IOLTA trust account for personal and business expenses) (admission of bank records issue, improper subpoena)
JUDGMENT OF DISBARMENT AFFIRMED: Opinion by Justice Frost
14-08-00526-CV George R. Neely v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline
Appeal from 164th District Court of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: Jack Hollis Robison

TAGS: Attorney disciplinary proceedings | lawyer disbarment and reinstatement

Motion to Disqualify opposing counsel denied

Courts are reluctant to grant a motion to disqualify opposing counsel where the facts allegedly creating a conflict were known or could have been discovered earlier and the motion was not filed until shortly before the trial, possibly as a delaying tactic. Court of Appeals here affirms denial.

Praise Tabernacle Outreach v. The Restoration Financial Group (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2008)

FROM THE OPINION:

Motion to Disqualify

We review the trial court's denial of a motion to disqualify for an abuse of discretion. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Syntek Fin. Corp., 881 S.W.2d 319, 321 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam). It is well-established that disqualification of a party's attorney is "a severe remedy." In re Nitla S.A. de C.V., 92 S.W.3d 419, 422 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam) (quoting Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1990).

Because disqualification of counsel "can result in immediate and palpable harm, disrupt trial court proceedings, and deprive a party of the right to have counsel of choice," a trial court considering a motion to disqualify "must strictly adhere to an exacting standard to discourage a party from using the motion as a dilatory trial tactic." Id. Mere allegations of unethical conduct or evidence showing a remote possibility of a violation of the disciplinary rules will not satisfy this standard. In re Sw. Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 141 S.W.3d 229, 231 (Tex. App.- San Antonio 2004, no pet.). Merely establishing a prior attorney-client relationship is insufficient to establish cause for disqualification. In re Chonody, 49 S.W.3d 376, 379 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 2000, no pet.). And even if a lawyer violates a disciplinary rule, the party requesting disqualification must demonstrate that the opposing lawyer's conduct caused actual prejudice that requires disqualification. Nitla, 92 S.W.3d at 422; In re Users Sys. Servs., Inc., 22 S.W.3d 331, 336-37 (Tex. 1999).

Here, the Church moved for disqualification based on Rule 109(a)(2) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct (the "Rules"), which provides, in pertinent part:

Without prior consent, a lawyer who personally has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in a matter adverse to the former client . . . if the representation in reasonable probability will involve a violation of Rule 1.05 . . . .

Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof'l Conduct 1.09(a)(2), reprinted in Tex. Gov't Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon Supp. 2007) (Tex. State Bar R. art. X ' 9). Rule 1.05 addresses the revelation or use of privileged information or confidential information acquired Aduring the course of or by reason of the representation of the client." Id. 1.05(a) (Vernon 2005).

The Church has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in denying its motion to disqualify Ward's counsel for several reasons. At the hearing on the motion, the Church asserted that it was only when it deposed a particular witness a month before trial that it learned of Brown's intent to make some use in the trial of this case of information about the Church's accounting practices that he obtained from his representation of the Church's pastor in a child custody proceeding or that he learned from consultations with the Church's general counsel.

Despite these assertions, the Church did not request the inclusion of this witness's deposition in the appellate record, and as the trial court pointed out, the Church's accounting practices are irrelevant to the breach of contract claim before the court. Moreover, the Church was aware for nearly a year that Brown was representing Ward, but did not move for disqualification until the week before trial.

In sum, the Church has identified no confidential information allegedly possessed by Brown relevant to Ward's breach of contract case, nor has the Church identified any authority that would support reversal of the trial court's judgment on this basis. We therefore overrule the Church's third issue.

Praise Tabernacle Outreach v. The Restoration Financial Group
(Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] July 29, 2008)(Guzman)
(breach of contract case, disqualification of counsel)
Opinion by Justice Eva M. Guzman
Panel Before Justices Brock Yates, Guzman and Brown
Appellate casue number: 14-06-01055-CV
Full case style: Praise Tabernacle Outreach & Family Worship Center and Reflections of Christ's Kingdom v. The Restoration Financial Group, Inc. and Felecia W. Ward
Appeal from County Court at Law No 2 & Probate Court of Brazoria County
Disposition: Affirmed

Mandamus in Disbarment Suit Denied

Court of Appeals says disbarred attorney has adequate remedy by appeal.

In Re George R. Neely
No. 14-08-00525-CV (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] June 26, 2008) (per curiam) (attorney discipline, mandamus denied in attorney disbarment case)
Panel: Before Chief Justice Hedges, Justices Fowler and Boyce
Full case style: In Re George R. Neely
Appeal from 164th District Court of Harris County
Judge: Jack H. Robison, assigned judge
Disposition: Petition for Mandamus denied

FROM THE OPINION:

Neely has asked us to issue a writ of mandamus vacating the disbarment order against him. He has also filed a motion for emergency relief, asking that we issue mandamus on an emergency basis because he is lead counsel in a case scheduled to begin trial on June 30.

We conclude that relator has an adequate appellate remedy, and therefore deny his mandamus petition.

Mandamus will not issue where there is an adequate remedy by appeal. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 842 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). An appellate remedy is not inadequate merely because it may involve more delay than obtaining an extraordinary writ. Id. Instead, an appellate remedy may be inadequate where a party stands to permanently lose substantial rights. See Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 257 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding). We remain mindful that the benefits of mandamus review are easily lost by overuse. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 148 S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).Neely has not demonstrated that he is in danger of permanently losing substantial rights. See Perry, 66 S.W.3d at 257.

Neely has an adequate remedy at law to appeal the trial court's final judgment of disbarment. See, e.g., Risker v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 94 S.W.3d 625, 627 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied); Skelton v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 56 S.W.3d 687, 689 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.). Mandamus relief is therefore unavailable. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 842; see also In re Worldpeace, No. 14-04-00726-CV, 2004 WL 1797685, at *1 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus, and further deny as moot relator's emergency motion to consider mandamus on an emergency basis.

Link to other June 2008 Decisions from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals

Attorney Disciplinary Proceeding Settled While on Appeal

Hayes v. Comm. for Lawyer Discipline (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] May 8, 2008) (per curiam) (joint motion to vacate, settlement)
VACATED AND REMANDED: Per Curiam
Before Justice Brock Yates, Justice John Anderson, and Justice Jeff Brown
14-07-00848-CV Thomas Hayes, IV v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline
Appeal from 281st District Court of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: The Honorable Laurine Blake

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from a judgment signed September 10, 2007.
On April 9, 2008, the parties filed a joint motion to set aside or vacate the judgment and remand the cause to the trial court for rendition of judgment in accordance with the parties' settlement agreement. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1. The motion is granted.

Accordingly, we vacate the judgment signed September 10, 2007, and we remand the cause to the trial court for rendition of judgment in accordance with the parties' agreement.

PER CURIAM

Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed May 8, 2008.
Panel consists of Justices Yates, Anderson, and Brown.