Just Don't Take It On Then: Heavy Workload not a good excuse multiple times in a row for not getting an appellate brief done on time

Justice Harvey Brown reminds appellate attorney that a heavy workload is no excuse not to timely complete and file a client's brief after multiple extension have already been granted in several pending cases to accommodate the attorney's time crunch issues.  

In the Interest of A. T. O. Jr., child,
v.
Department of Family and Protective Services.

No. 01-18-00173-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, First District, Houston.

May 2, 2018.

Appeal from the 313th District Court of Harris County, 2017-01254J.

ORDER

HARVEY BROWN, Judge.

Appellant's brief was originally due on April 18, 2018. Appellant's counsel, asserting a heavy workload, filed a motion requesting an extension of time to file appellant's brief to April 30, 2018. Our court granted the extension. On April 30, 2018, appellant's counsel filed a second motion to further extend the time for filing appellant's brief to May 11, 2018, again asserting a heavy workload.

The motion is granted with no further extensions. Counsel is reminded that a heavy workload does not constitute good cause for granting repeated motions to extend the time to file a brief. See Pena v. State, No. 07-11-00222-CR, 2011 WL 6015763, at *1 n.2 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Dec. 2, 2011, order) ("This Court does not consider a busy work schedule to constitute good cause for granting repeated motions to extend the time to file a brief.") (citing Curry v. Clayton, 715 S.W.2d 77, 79-80 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ)).  

Counsel's second extension motion reflects that he has at least three other pending parental termination appeals, all of which have received extensions. If counsel is unable to meet statutory deadlines due to workload, then counsel should accept fewer cases rather than regularly seeking extensions. Newfield v. State, 766 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, order) ("A situation in which an attorney regularly requests extensions in each case submitted to this Court is unacceptable.").

It is so ORDERED.