Order Denying Motion to Recuse Trial Judge Not Immediately Appealable

Larkins-Ruby v Sealy ISD et al, No. 01-17-00716-CV (Tex.App. - Houston [1st Dist.] May 15, 2018) (no appeal from order denying motion to recuse in interlocutory appeal, appeal only feasible from final judgment). 

Opinion issued May 15, 2018

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-17-00716-CV

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JENNIFER ANN LARKINS-RUBY, Appellant

V.

SEALY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL., Appellees

On Appeal from the 155th District Court

Austin County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2017V-0103

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jennifer Ann Larkins-Ruby, proceeding pro se, attempts to appeal from an
interlocutory order denying her motion to recuse the trial court judge. Appellees
have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that a
final judgment has not issued in the case and an interlocutory appeal of the order is
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not authorized. Appellant’s response failed to demonstrate a basis for our court’s
jurisdiction over the appeal. We grant appellees’ motion and dismiss the appeal.

Generally, appellate courts have jurisdiction only over appeals from final
judgments. See Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); N.E.
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1966). A judgment is final
for purposes of appeal if the judgment disposes of all pending parties and claims
before the trial court. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d at 895. The clerk’s record filed in this
appeal does not show, and appellant has not asserted, that the trial court has signed
a final judgment that disposes of all parties and claims before the Court.

An appellate court also has jurisdiction to consider an appeal from an
interlocutory order if a statute explicitly provides jurisdiction. Stary v. DeBord, 967
S.W.2d 352, 352–53 (Tex. 1998); see, e.g., TEX.R.CIV. PROC. § 51.014 (authorizing
appeals from certain interlocutory orders). But no statute authorizes an appeal from
an interlocutory order denying a motion to recuse. See Rizk v. Gray, No. 01–16–
00374–CV, 2016 WL 7104020, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 6, 2016,
no pet.) (mem. op.). To the contrary, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a(j)(1)(A)
expressly provides that “[a]n order denying a motion to recuse may be reviewed only
for abuse of discretion on appeal from the final judgment.” TEX. R. CIV. PROC.
18a(j)(1)(A); see Rizk, 2016 WL 7104020, at *1 (explaining interlocutory order
denying motion to recuse “is appealable only on appeal of the final judgment”). We,
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thus, lack jurisdiction over appellant’s attempted appeal of the order denying her
motion to recuse.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dismiss any
other pending motion as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Massengale and Brown.